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| A "Vanguard" nuclear submarine at its naval base, Faslane, Argyll, in Scotland. |
BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR
DETERRENT?
By Dr David Morrison (Exectutive Member, Peace and Neutrality Alliance Ireland).
Britain’s nuclear deterrent isn’t “independent”
The Conservative Party is in
favour of Britain retaining a nuclear weapons system, and so is the Labour
Party. To that end, both are committed
to the replacement of the four submarines built in Britain from which US-supplied
Trident II missiles carrying nuclear warheads can be launched. Labour in
government initiated the process of replacement by publishing a White Paper, The
Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent, in December 2006. This recommended that the new system should
provide ‘continuous at-sea deterrence’ (CASD) as the current one does – in
other words, that at least one submarine be on patrol armed with Trident
missiles at any time. The White Paper
left open the possibility that this capability could be provided by three submarines
instead of the existing four. The White
Paper proposals were approved by the House of Commons in March 2007. The final decision on the issue
is due next year. Irrespective of the
outcome of the general election, there will be an overwhelming majority in the
House of Commons in favour of building the submarines necessary to maintain
‘continuous at-sea deterrence’, though the SNP, Plaid Cymru, and a number of
Labour backbenchers will vote against.
The replacement of the present Trident submarines is certain to proceed.
On 9 April 2015, Minister of Defence, Michael Fallon, has tried to suggest that
it won’t proceed if Labour has to rely on the SNP for a majority after the
general election. This piece of fantasy
was invented by the Conservative election machine for the purpose of mounting a
personal attack on Labour leader Ed Miliband, attacking him personally being
the main thrust of the Conservative electoral campaign at the moment.
There is no doubt that the UK will have a submarine-based nuclear weapons system that could remain operational into the 2060s. It will cost the British taxpayer about £25 billion to build the replacement submarines and the related infrastructure, plus about £2 billion a year to operate them, that is, upwards of £100 billion during the lifetime of the system.
Conservative and Labour advocates
for the system describe it as an “independent” nuclear deterrent. On 9 April, Michael Fallon said
that, if a Labour government scrapped it, this “would shatter the 60 year
consensus that has existed among governments of all colours in favour of an
operationally independent nuclear deterrent”.
Labour responded
by insisting that “Labour is committed to maintaining a minimum, credible,
independent nuclear deterrent, delivered through a ‘continuous at-sea
deterrent’”. But is Britain’s nuclear
deterrent really “independent”? At
least eight (and perhaps nine) states in the world now possess functional
nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. All of them, bar one, manufacture and
maintain their own nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. All of them, bar one, have complete control
over the use of their systems. In other
words, all of them, bar one, possess what can reasonably be described as an
“independent” nuclear deterrent that doesn’t rely on another state to provide
vital parts of it.
The exception is Britain. China has an “independent” nuclear
deterrent. So has France, India, Israel,
Pakistan, Russia and the US – and perhaps North Korea. Britain
hasn’t. Unlike other states that have nuclear weapons systems, Britain is
dependent on another state to manufacture an essential element of its only
nuclear weapons system – the Trident missiles that are supposed to carry
Britain’s weapons to target. These are
manufactured by Lockheed Martin in the US. And Britain’s dependence on the US
doesn’t end with the purchase of the missiles – Britain depends on the US Navy
to service the missiles as well. A
common pool of missiles is maintained at the US Strategic Weapons facility at
King’s Bay, Georgia, USA, from which the US itself and Britain draw serviced
missiles as required. There is some doubt about the degree of
“operational” independence that Britain enjoys in respect of its nuclear
weapons system (of which more later).
But there is no doubt that Britain is dependent on the US for the
manufacture and maintenance of a key element of the system. So, to call it an “independent” nuclear
deterrent is fraudulent.
Independent foreign
policy?
The plain truth is that, if Britain doesn’t
maintain friendly relations with the US, then it won’t have a functional
nuclear weapons system, despite having spent billions of pounds of British
taxpayers’ money on it – because the US would simply cease providing Britain
with serviceable Trident missiles. So, there is a strong incentive for
Britain to follow the US in foreign policy, since independence from the US in
foreign policy could lead to its nuclear weapons system becoming
non-functional. Sustained opposition to
the US in foreign policy certainly would.
As long as Britain is tied to the US by a requirement for US-supplied
and maintained missiles for its nuclear weapons system, it cannot have a wholly
independent foreign policy. In these circumstances, it is highly unlikely
that Britain would use its nuclear weapons system to strike a target without
the approval of the US, whether or not it is theoretically possible for Britain
to do so. So, it is absurd to describe
it as “independent” nuclear deterrent. The above applies to the UK’s
current nuclear weapons system. But it
applies equally to the proposed replacement.
To ask the British taxpayer to fork out upwards of £100 billion in the
pretence that the UK will continue to possess an “independent” nuclear
deterrent is fraudulent.
Surprisingly, December 2006 White Paper
conceded that our US-dependent nuclear deterrent will become non-functional if
relations sour with the US. Paragraph
4-7 puts it this way: “We continue to believe that the costs of
developing a nuclear deterrent relying solely on UK sources outweigh the
benefits. We do not see a good case for making what would be a substantial
additional investment in our nuclear deterrent purely to insure against a,
highly unlikely, deep and enduring breakdown in relations with the US. We
therefore believe that it makes sense to continue to procure elements of the
system from the US.” It would be more honest to say that Britain is
incapable of building a credible deterrent relying solely on UK sources. It lost that capacity over 50 years ago with
the termination of the Blue Streak ballistic missile project, which is why we
ended up buying first Polaris, and then Trident, submarine-launched missiles
from the US.
Operationally
independent?
British Governments have always
insisted that Britain’s nuclear weapons system is “operationally” independent
of the US. The December 2006 White Paper
(4-6) states that “the UK’s current nuclear deterrent is fully operationally
independent of the US”. Apparently, if a
British Prime Minister decides to press the nuclear button, it is impossible
for the US to stop the launch of missiles or prevent them from delivering
British nuclear warheads to the selected target. Maybe so. Is a British Prime Minister really
free to strike any target he/she chooses in this world with nuclear weapons, at
a time of his choosing, using US-supplied missiles? I doubt that the US would sell any foreign
power – even a close ally – a weapons system with which the foreign power is
free to do catastrophic damage to US allies, not to mention the US itself. Surely, the US must have a mechanism, under
its explicit control, to prevent the targeting of states that it doesn’t want
targeted?
David Morrison
9 April 2015
(Dr David Morrison is a distinguished academic at the Queen’s
University of Belfast, Northern Ireland, an expert on international affairs and
global politics and Executive Member of Peace and Neutrality Alliance Ireland )
