IRAN'S "NUCLEAR THREAT"
CONCOCTED BY
WASHINGTON:
By Dr David Morrison & Peter Osborne:
As talks about an Iranian nuclear deal stretch into a second
week, this article is an attempt to provide context to the dispute, how it
arose in the first place, why it wasn’t settled a long time ago, and why a
settlement is possible today.
The primary international treaty regulating nuclear activity
by states is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT: sponsored by Ireland at the United Nations). Iran is a “non-nuclear weapon”
state party to the treaty and has been since its inception in 1970. Like other
non-nuclear weapon state parties, it has an “inalienable right” to engage in
nuclear activity for peaceful purposes under the supervision of the
International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). This includes the right to enrich
uranium on its own soil. We have that on the authority of John Kerry, the
present US Secretary of State, who, in an interview in the Financial Times in 2009, said: “They
[Iran] have a right to peaceful nuclear power and to enrichment in that
purpose.”
Despite this, the US has been trying for the past decade and
more to coerce Iran into ceasing uranium enrichment. In recent years the US and
the EU have applied ferocious sanctions on Iran in an attempt to force it to do
so, damaging the well-being of millions of Iranians in the process.
Manufactured dispute
That is the origin of the present dispute about Iran’s
nuclear activities. The dispute was manufactured in Washington: had the US
accepted from the outset that Iran had a right to enrichment, as Kerry stated,
there would have been no dispute at all, let alone one that has lasted for a
decade, and no need for the present negotiations to resolve it.
The dispute could also have been settled on amicable terms
in 2005 before the US-orchestrated sanctions, when negotiations were going on
with the EU3 (UK, France and Germany). Iran’s enrichment programme was then in
its infancy and no centrifuges were enriching uranium in Iran. Today, more than
19,000 centrifuges are installed, around 10,000 of which are operational.
At that time, in exchange for the EU3 agreeing to its right
to enrichment, Iran offered to agree limits on the volume of production and to
put in place unprecedented measures – over and above the safeguards required under
the NPT – to reassure the outside world that its nuclear programme was for
peaceful purposes. A settlement wasn’t reached because the US insisted that
Iran must not enrich uranium on its own soil, and the EU3 shamefully
acquiesced.
The present negotiations have the potential to resolve the
dispute precisely because the US has given up its attempt to coerce Iran into
ceasing enrichment. That was made clear in the initial Joint Plan of Action agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013.
Retaining enrichment facilities on its own soil has always
been Iran’s bottom line and it has been prepared to endure years of wholly
unjustified sanctions in order to defend that principle.
Sanctions threat
Now, although the US has conceded the principle, it is
insisting that for the next 10 or 15 years Iran must agree to severe
restrictions on its enrichment capabilities and on other aspects of its nuclear
programme, under threat that the present sanctions would be maintained or even
intensified.
There is no justification for imposing such restrictions on
a sovereign state. As a non-nuclear weapon party to the NPT, Iran is forbidden
from acquiring nuclear weapons, but the treaty places no limits on civil
nuclear activity under IAEA supervision.
Iran may agree to accept restrictions on its nuclear
activities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, but they are doing so
under duress and the restrictions are an infringement of Iran’s rights under
the NPT.
The stated reason for the US imposing these restrictions is
to eliminate, or at least severely reduce, Iran’s ability to develop nuclear
weapons. To this end, the US asserts that Iran’s enrichment facilities must be
limited so that the “the breakout time”, that is, the time needed to enrich
enough uranium to weapons grade for one bomb, is increased to around a year
from what is said to be two or three months at present. This in turn assumes
that Iran has the ambition to develop nuclear weapons, as Israel did many years
ago, or will acquire such an ambition if the opportunity to do so arises in the
future.
Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, and his
allies in the US Congress purport to believe that Iran has had that ambition
and has been actively trying to realise it for many years. In 1992, he predicted that Iran was three to five years from being able
to produce a nuclear weapon and said that the threat had to be "uprooted
by an international front headed by the US”.
In his book Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare
published last year, the American investigative journalist Gareth Porter
demonstrated meticulously that the intelligence on which assertions that Iran
has or had a nuclear weapons programme was either misinterpreted or simply
false. As for the IAEA, it has never found any evidence at Iran’s nuclear
facilities of the diversion of nuclear material for possible military purposes.
Iran has repeatedly denied that it has any ambitions to
develop nuclear weapons. What is more, in 2005 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s
Supreme Leader, issued a fatwa saying
that “the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden
under Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these
weapons”. He has repeated that message many times since then.
Bush ‘angry’
In the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, produced in
November 2007, the 16 US intelligence services expressed the consensus view
that Iran did not have an active nuclear weapons programme at that time, having
in their view halted a programme in 2003. The reaction of President George W.
Bush to this good news is instructive: it made him “angry”. We know this
because he says so in his memoir, Decision Points. One might have
thought that the president would have welcomed intelligence that Iran wasn’t
developing nuclear weapons. After all, preventing the country acquiring nuclear
weapons was supposed to be a major objective of his foreign policy. But instead
he was angry – because it cut the ground from under his efforts to gain
international support for what he termed “dealing with Iran”, which clearly
went beyond ensuring that it did not possess a nuclear weapons programme.
Specifically, it made it impossible for him to take military action against
Iran.
“The NIE didn’t just undermine diplomacy. It also tied my
hands on the military side,” Bush wrote. “There were many reasons I was
concerned about undertaking a military strike on Iran, including its uncertain
effectiveness and the serious problems it would create for Iraq’s fragile young
democracy. But after the NIE, how could I possibly explain using the
military to destroy the nuclear facilities of a country the intelligence
community said had no active nuclear weapons programme?”
Could there be a more telling demonstration that the Bush
administration was not concerned that Iran actually had a nuclear weapons
programme? Rather its concern was that it would become obvious that Iran did
not have one, and that as a result the US would no longer be able to maintain
international support for “dealing with Iran”. Let us suppose that the present
negotiations conclude successfully (despite opposition in Washington, Riyadh
and Jerusalem) with Iran establishing its right to enrich uranium, albeit with
unjust limitations, and with the lifting of sanctions against the
country. Let us suppose also that Iran takes a decision to put this
substantial achievement at risk by attempting to develop nuclear weapons, which
according to its Supreme Leader are “forbidden under Islam”. To that end, it
would have to attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. Since it has been
agreed that IAEA inspectors will have continuous access to the Natanz
enrichment plant, an operational change to enrich above the agreed maximum of
3.67 percent would soon become known to the IAEA and to the world.
It is absurd to believe that it would take a year for the US
and/or Israel to mount a response to clear evidence that Iran had breached the
agreement and was hell-bent on producing weapons-grade uranium. The likeliest response
would be the complete destruction by military means of the nuclear
infrastructure that Iran has devoted so much effort to building up over many
years. Iran is not going to take that risk. Despite engaging with Iran on the
nuclear issue, the Obama administration hasn’t changed the basic US narrative
about Iran, namely, that it is an aggressive power and a destabilising force in
the Middle East which acts contrary to the interests of the US and its allies
and threatens Israel’s very existence; that it is a malign influence in various
parts of the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and latterly Yemen) which, if
given the opportunity, would develop nuclear weapons and then be in a position
to further destabilise the region. Because of this, it is a power that the US
and its allies must seek to contain and keep down rather than dealing with as a
legitimate player who could help to sort out the region’s problems.
This narrative hasn’t changed despite Iran fighting
alongside the US in Iraq against the Islamic State group. This is not an
unprecedented development given that Iran was of great help to the US against
al-Qaeda in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 in Afghanistan. It is fighting
against IS, despite not being part of the grand US-led anti-IS coalition, the
vast majority of whose 60-plus members are doing no fighting at all. Obama has
therefore argued for a nuclear agreement with Iran as a means of containing it
and preventing it developing nuclear weapons – and not as a first step on the
road to a comprehensive rapprochement. His narrative doesn’t differ
fundamentally from that of Netanyahu and his allies in the US Congress, who
question the sense of lifting sanctions against a state which you wish to keep
down and wonder whether the removal of restrictions will only reduce Iran’s
“breakout time” to develop a bomb to a month or two.
Obama’s reply has been that maybe Iran will have “changed”
in some way by then. But that is not a line with which he deserves to win the
argument against his detractors in Congress.
[Dr David Morrison is based at the Queen’s University of
Belfast, Northern Ireland and is an Executive Member of Ireland’s Peace and
Neutrality Alliance (PANA- see sidebar for site link)’
Peter Osborne is a British freelance journalist and former
Chief Political Correspondent of the London Daily
Telegraph.
- David Morrison and Peter Osborne are
the authors of "A Dangerous Delusion: Why the West is Wrong about
Nuclear Iran" (published by Elliott & Thompson, 2013)]